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Centre de recherche sur les Risques et les Crises

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

■ Decision-Making in Extreme Situation

From Accident Mitigation to Resilient Society
Facing Extreme Situation

Sébastien Travadel



Fukushima: Faulty Decision-Making?

- Yoshida: *« it was total confusion. And that was in this atmosphere that it was necessary to give orders. So I recognize that it was not done in a logical and considered order »*
- A 10km radius zone chosen simply because it was the maximum area for an EPZ as set out in the Disaster Prevention Plan. A 20km-radius evacuation zone decided upon simply because of some people's subjective opinions.
- Decision making transfer to population in the 20-30 km *« deliberate evacuation area »*. Lack of sufficient information to decide.




The Missing Dimensions of Decision-Making

- Yoshida: « *anyway, in terms of solutions, we did not have anything much better than injecting with the fire pump and using the fire engine. Could we have reacted more quickly if we had known? I think that physically, we could not have gone faster* »
-> **Core of the Extreme Situation**
- Objectives other than health maintenance and prevention may enter in the decision to evacuate (avoid successive displacements, public order, etc.).
- Mass behavior in disasters and emergency evacuations is not instinctual and individualized. Rather, it is cognitive BUT ALSO above all, it is socially structured, collectively patterned and meaningful.



- In the core of the extreme situation, people have to reinvent their action plan. This cannot be fully deterministic.
- Mass evacuation behavior is complex, panic is not the general tendency. People develop specific values in the unfolding of a disaster.
- We should recognize the capacity of people *in situ* to foster resilience.



Thank you for your attention!